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Symposium on Buddhist Perspectives on Free 
Will: Agentless Agency? 
Rick Repetti 1 
Abstract 
This special issue of the Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Volume 
25, is a symposium on the anthology, Buddhist Perspectives 
on Free Will: Agentless Agency? (Repetti), and on the topic 
reflected by that title, more broadly, based on an Author 
Meets Critics session of the 2018 American Philosophical 
Association Eastern Division meeting organized by Chris-
tian Coseru. To orient readers new to the topic, I first 
sketch what some of the issues are regarding Buddhist 
perspectives on free will. Second, I briefly describe the an-
thology, and third, I introduce the several contributions 
to this symposium. As I am sympathetic to most of the pa-
pers here, I only respond briefly to them in this introduc-
tion, giving some reasons for my approval. Two papers 
here, however, are significantly critical of either the an-
thology as a whole (Brent), or critical of my contributions 
1 Department of Philosophy, Kingsborough Community College, City University of New 
York. Email: rick.repetti@kbcc.cuny.edu. 
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to it (Meyers). I respond separately to each of them in the 
last two papers in the symposium. Together with this in-
troduction, all the included papers are original. 
This special issue of the Journal of Buddhist Ethics is a symposium devoted 
broadly to the subject of Buddhist perspectives on free will. The sympo-
sium grew out of what was originally to be an "Author Meets Critics" 
panel on that topic, where I was the author, the critics were Marie 
Friquegnon and Michael Brent, the chair (also session organizer) was 
Christian Coseru, and the book was the edited collection, Buddhist Per-
spectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency? The panel was scheduled to be held 
at the 2018 Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical As-
sociation (APA) in Savannah, Georgia in January of this year. However, 
due to inclement weather, the event was cancelled. 
Daniel Cozort, general editor of the Journal of Buddhist Ethics (JBE), 
was gracious enough to allow me to salvage most of the efforts that went 
into preparing for that panel, originally organized and to be chaired by 
Christian Coseru, by agreeing to publish the panel papers and allow me 
to be the special issue editor. Whereas such conference panels are typi-
cally constrained by time to permit a few presenters, each with a limited 
amount of time, followed by the author's response(s), this broader venue 
enabled us to open up the discussion to longer papers, additional pre-
senters, and to papers more broadly covering the topic of Buddhist per-
spectives on free will. The resulting several papers turned out to be 
enough to constitute the equivalent of an edited collection.2 
2 This Symposium could have as easily been published as a second volume to the edited 
collection. However, in light of the generosity of support offered to me by this journal 
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Thus, this special ]BE issue contains modified versions of those 
three original panel papers written by Michael Brent, Karin Meyers, and 
Marie Friquegnon, as well as four additional papers written by Katie Ja-
vanaud, Asaf Federman and Oren Ergas, Jonathan Gold, and James Luisi; 
they either address particular articles, themes, or arguments from Bud-
dhist Perspectives on Free Will, the collection as a whole, or just the topic of 
possible Buddhist views on free will in general. My individual responses 
to only two of those papers-one critical paper by Michael Brent, whose 
manuscript targets most of the papers in the edited collection, and an-
other by Karin Meyers, whose paper is directed primarily at my own 
contributions to the edited collection-will follow those seven papers in 
the symposium. My brief, approving responses to the other papers will 
be included in this introduction to the symposium. 
I encourage the authors of all the papers presented here, as well 
as our readers, to submit short responses to these papers, using the 
"Comments" feature on this website, which functions as an interactive 
blog. Or, if anyone is so inclined, more substantive (article-length) re-
sponses may be submitted directly to the Journal of Buddhist Ethics for 
consideration for formal publication.3 
Before I sketch what each of the present papers is about, it would 
be helpful to briefly discuss the edited collection that serves as the focal 
point for most of them, and to say a few things about the issues that in-
throughout my years of working with it, I thought it fitting to bring this work here, 
where most of my publications on the subject were originally well-received and greatly 
supported throughout the peer review and editorial processes. Another reason for pub-
lishing this collection here is the greater accessibility of the ]BE, as well as its interac-
tive functionality as a blog, enabling reader commentary. 
3 Two other scholars, Arindam chakrabarti and Daniel Breyer, each (separately) agreed 
to submit papers to this collection, but they were unable to complete them on time. 
Those papers might be published here separately, later. 
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form it. That is, what are the issues connected with the question of Bud-
dhist perspectives on free will? By first sketching those, readers other-
wise unfamiliar with this subject ought to be able to enter into it here. 
What Do, or Can, Buddhists Think about Free Will? 
That is the question, and it is more problematic than meets the eye. 
There are many problems lurking beneath it, some less obvious than 
others. I will only sketch some of these problems here, not only to bring 
readers into the discussion, but also to demonstrate the complexity of 
the free will problems (note the plural) in Buddhism, and to show how the 
issue is just as complex, if not more complex, than the free will problem 
in Western philosophy. 
Can There Be Agency without an Agent-Self? 
Today, most people in the West are minimally aware that Buddhism is 
typically known to espouse the view that the self is something of an illu-
sion, whatever that ultimately means. But it could mean different things, 
and to different traditions and scholars within Buddhist philosophy, it 
does mean different things. It could just mean that the self exists, for ex-
ample, but not in the way it seems to exist. By analogy, there are sunris-
es and rainbows, but they do not exist in the way they seem to exist, at 
least not in the way they seem for those uneducated about earth-spin 
and the way clouds function to refract electromagnetic wavelengths 
within the visible range. Rainbows are illusory, and so are sunrises; they 
still exist, just not in the way ordinary perception presents them to our 
understanding. 
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In any case, upon reflection, if I consider this claim about the illu-
sory nature of the self, in conjunction with the idea that the things that I 
do are up to me, that is, that I act freely, or with free will, then the ques-
tion immediately arises: How can my actions be mine, or genuinely up to 
me if I-an alleged self-am subject to an illusion about whether or what I 
am? That's the first and perhaps the foremost problem facing the ques-
tion of whether there can be free will within Buddhism. Hence, the subti-
tle of the anthology under question: Agentless Agency? That is, how can 
there be agency (free will) without an agent (a self), or self-rule (autono-
my) with a self? For this reason, many Buddhist philosophers, scholars, 
Dharma teachers,4 and followers of Buddhism simply reject the concept 
of free will as an illusion: If there is no self, there can be no autonomous 
self. 
Others, however, disagree, as do I. To make a simple analogy: 
suppose the no-self doctrine is correct, however that doctrine may be 
understood (as sketched above, say, with sunrises and rainbows). Sup-
pose, technically speaking, speaking is usually understood to require a 
speaker. It would not necessarily follow from the no-self doctrine that 
there is no speech. Instead, one could simply jettison the old idea that 
speech requires a speaker, or alter one's understanding of what it means 
to be a speaker, e.g., the person speaking. Intuitively, that makes more 
sense than denying that there is speech. For to deny that there is speech 
is to commit a performative contradiction: it requires speech to deny 
that there is speech. There are many other ways to make out an intelligi-
4 Unlike, but somewhat similar to, the Hindu meaning of the term, "the Dharma" is the 
Buddhist term for Buddhism, the truth as espoused by Buddhists, or the way or path of 
Buddhism, among related meanings. Thus, Dharma teachers include Buddhas, other 
enlightened beings, meditation masters, advanced meditation practitioners, and others 
who espouse the Dharma, whether in sutras, sermons, lectures, or other formats. It is 
believed that even hearing the Dharma is the result of, and brings, propitious circum-
stances or good karma. 
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ble position to the effect that there may be agency without an agent, by 
analogy. Whether any such ways of doing so are sound is the question. 
The no-self doctrine poses, in my view, the main free will prob-
lem in Buddhism, but there are others. Let us review some of them. 
Can There Be Karma and Rebirth without an Agent-Self? 
Another problem has to do with the doctrines of karma and rebirth, and 
is closely related to the question posed to the Buddha by the Brahmins 
inquiring how it was possible for karma and reincarnation (Buddhists 
prefer to refer to this as rebirth) to occur in the absence of a self or soul 
whose karma it is and who is reborn. If there is no agent-self, so to speak, 
how can there be karma and rebirth? Karma is technically intention, vo-
lition, and/ or volitional action, and free will may be described as auton-
omous choice, and/ or as autonomous action, both of which may be con-
sidered forms of volitional action. But if there is no agent, how can there 
be choice, volition, action, and karma? Whose karma is it, and who is re-
born? How can the term, which implies being born again, apply to what 
appears to be two non-identical beings, since the term implies one being, 
who was born before, being born again? If there is no identity between 
them, there is no basis for the idea that birth has occurred again. 
This question has been addressed, from the time of the Buddha 
himself, although not emphasizing the agency side as much as the issue 
of how there can be karma and rebirth without a self whose karma it is, 
and who or what is reborn. But surely there is a link between the karma 
issue and agency: karma is volition, and free will is a kind of volitional 
freedom. Some understand karma to be iron-clad and thus unavoidable 
or inevitable, rightly or wrongly, but it is easy to see how such a view of 
karma could give rise to a free will question: If everything we experience 
is the inevitable result of karma, beginningless karma, no less, how can 
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there be free will? But if there is no free will, then why is anyone respon-
sible for what they do, even karmically? Likewise, if everything is kar-
mic, how is it that the Buddhist path can allegedly reverse the stream 
and lead to liberation? 
It is not emphasized enough, in my view, that the Buddha reject-
ed several forms of fatalism or, as I prefer to lump them together, inevi-
tabilisms: inevitable causation by gods, fate, matter, chance, and, most 
notably, karma. Thus, the Buddha implicitly believed in some sort of 
non-inevitabilism, or evitabilism, when it comes to volition. 
Is Agency Inconsistent with Buddhist Causation? 
Another free will problem within Buddhism concerns the broader Bud-
dhist conception of causation. The Buddhist doctrine of dependent orig-
ination, which holds, roughly, that whatever arises depends on causal 
conditions, and is often thought to be functionally similar to (if not, for 
some, identical with) the Western scientific/philosophical doctrine of 
determinism, which holds, roughly, that whatever arises depends lawful-
ly on causal conditions. 
There are some significant differences in these doctrines, and 
there are different versions of both, and thus Buddhist scholars and 
Western philosophers disagree on the proper interpretation of each, but 
there is enough resemblance between them to lead some contributors to 
this discussion to conclude that, if Buddhist causation is deterministic, 
then, just as in Western philosophy, this poses a challenge to belief in 
free will: How can a choice be free if it is the lawfully necessary conse-
quence of previous causal conditions? 
A related question is: If everything is causally conditioned, then 
how can enlightenment, which is described as unconditioned and cause-
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less, be brought about by that which is conditioned? One metaphorical 
reply is to see enlightenment as our underlying Buddha nature, obscured 
by ignorance, not brought about but revealed by removing the obscura-
tion. 
Is Free Will Possible in Light of the Buddha's Alleged Omniscience? 
Yet another problem concerns the Buddha's alleged omniscience, which 
is sometimes described as restricted to whatever the Buddha turns his 
attentive gaze, such as the past and future lives of particular sentient 
beings. This problem resembles the problem of divine foreknowledge in 
Western theology: If an omniscient being (God, the Buddha, or anyone, 
for that matter) impeccably foreknows that I will choose X in the future, 
how could that choice be free? For the choice to be truly free, it seems 
we must be able to bring about either of the two or more alternatives 
that constitute the choice, but if only one outcome is already known by 
an all-knowing being that cannot be falsified, then the other alternative 
was never truly available. None of the contributors in this symposium 
address this particular problem, although it is touched upon briefly in 
the anthology (Harvey 163-165). 
Can a Non-Agent Make the Choice and Efforts to Follow the Buddhist Path? 
Another problem concerns the problematic idea of how anyone can 
choose to follow the Buddhist path, or make the heroic efforts required 
to traverse it, if no one has free will. Rather than make the sort of Olym-
pic-training-level efforts that are prescribed in order to follow the Bud-
dhist Eightfold Path, if there is no free will, what reason is there for any-
one to try, when instead it would be easier to just sit back and wait to 
become enlightened, since when that happens is not up to one. Even 
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some of the Buddhist sages have seen and addressed this problem, which 
is why it is addressed here in the symposium and in the anthology. 
If There Are No Agent-Selves, How Can Buddhist Titans of Mind-Control Exist? 
A more pressing problem concerns how Buddhism can account for the 
titanic autonomy-like powers of its meditation adepts if there is no free 
will, akin to imagining how someone can lift three hundred pounds but 
cannot lift ten pounds. If making effort is hard to explain absent free 
will, then explaining the successful cultivation of titanic skills after the 
sustained exertion of Olympic athlete level efforts over decades, if not 
lifetimes, is even more difficult. Self-mastery without a self: the very 
verbal formulation outwardly displays its internal conflict. This issue is 
addressed in detail in the anthology, and to a significant extent here. 
Is There Free Will in Either of the Two Truths? 
Another problem has to do with the Buddhist doctrine of the two truths, 
one conventional or relative, the other ultimate or absolute. This doc-
trine is interpreted in different ways by earlier and later Buddhists. Sim-
plifying greatly, early Buddhist foundationalist reductionists view mo-
mentary, psychophysical atomistic tropes as the ultimate reals, and eve-
rything else that is composite, partite, and constructed out of them, as 
only conventionally real, since there are no wholes above and apart from 
their parts. For them, the person is no more than a composite construc-
tion of all of its aggregated, momentary components, and so is its alleged 
autonomy, but none of these are ultimately real. Also simplifying {great-
ly), later Buddhists reject even the foundationalist idea that the atomis-
tic tropes are real, so for them everything is equally and only conven-
tionally real. The only ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth. 
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Alternately put, the idea is that everything is empty of essence, inde-
pendent-being, or self-nature. Thus, for them, persons and free will are, 
at best, only conventionally real, and there are disputes among later 
Buddhist schools even about what things count as conventionally real. 
In both early and later Buddhist views, however, conventional 
reality is not ultimately real, so ultimately there is no free will. If so, 
however, all the above problems become all the more pressing. Again, 
there are divergent understandings of the two truths doctrine within 
Buddhism, further complicating this question. 
The Edited Collection, Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will 
There are other problems with free will within Buddhism, but the above 
sketch ought to suffice to provide the context for what follows. Let us 
turn now to sketch the anthology that forms the focal point for this 
symposium. 
After having published a handful of my own articles on this topic 
in this journal between 2010 and 2014, Daniel Cozort, general editor of 
Journal of Buddhist Ethics, suggested that I had enough material for a book. 
Routledge agreed and published the edited collection Buddhist Perspec-
tives on Free Will: Agentless Agency? in 2017, and then published my mono-
graph on the same subject, Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will: A Theory of 
Mental Freedom, in 2018, the latter text of which contains a much more 
comprehensive treatment of my own view of the subject, as well as a 
critical review of all the other papers in the former text. There is only so 
much that can be expressed in an article or chapter, and only so many 
possible alternatives and potential objections that may be raised or re-
sponded to within such parameters. Thus, readers interested in a more 
complete account of my own view of the subject are directed to the 
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 647 
monograph, which unfortunately saw print only after the original APA 
Author Meets Critics panel was scheduled to convene, and just around 
the time the present papers were already mostly composed, in which 
case many of the critical points raised in some of the present papers 
were already forestalled, preempted, or otherwise foreclosed in the 
monograph.5 
The edited collection under review here, then, contains a sub-
stantive preface and introduction, and seventeen chapters in the follow-
ing order, written by Christopher W. Gowans, me, Charles Goodman, Jay 
Garfield, Owen Flanagan, Galen Strawson, Susan Blackmore, Christian 
Coseru, Marie Friquegnon, B. Alan Wallace, Martin T. Adam, Mark Sider-
its, Ben Abelson, Peter Harvey, Emily McRae, Karin Meyers, and a final 
chapter by me. A few of these were revised versions of earlier papers, 
but the bulk were originally written for the collection. The sixteen au-
thors altogether reflect a divergence of views among scholars and phi-
losophers of Buddhism that parallels that of Western philosophers who 
specialize in free will, and the collection of articles constitutes the bulk 
of extant scholarship on the topic, with a few exceptions, including my 
own recently published monograph, the first entirely devoted to the 
question of Buddhism and free will. Likewise, the anthology was the first 
collection of essays on Buddhism and free will. 
Before the publication of the anthology, little had been written 
explicitly on the topic of Buddhist perspectives on free will, at most 
around a dozen or so articles, beginning in the latter half of the Twenti-
eth century, some published in this journal (including one of my own, 
plus my own four critiques of most of them). The anthology reflects the 
5 Another "Author Meets Critics" session, this time devoted to the above-mentioned 
monograph, will be held at the January 7-10, 2019 meeting of the AP A Eastern Division 
in New York City, both organized and to be chaired by Christian Coseru. 
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lack of consensus in the Buddhist philosophical community about 
whether the subject of free will is even a legitimate subject matter for 
Buddhism, given the fairly widespread interpretation of the Buddhist 
view of the self as illusory, the fairly divergent metaphysics to be found 
in the different Buddhist traditions, and the different understandings of 
agency thereof, among many other points of contention. 
My own contributions to the edited collection were threefold. 
First, as the editor, I tried (Preface; Introduction) to introduce the issues 
connected with attempting a Buddhist position on free will to be raised 
in the divergent contributions in a manner that revealed their philo-
sophical complexity, some ways in which they do and/ or do not parallel 
Western philosophical understanding, some ways in which these appar-
ently orthogonal conceptual differences may be seen as problematizing 
the basic concepts in the discussion, and noting general features of some 
of the representatively divergent approaches and conceptions. Second, I 
contributed one chapter (Why) defending the idea that there can and 
ought to be a Buddhist theory of free will. This is contrary to the view 
that Javanaud describes in her contribution here as Buddhist "skepti-
cism" about free will (not to suggest that Javanaud is such a skeptic), re-
flected in varying degrees by contributors Blackmore, Flanagan, Garfield, 
Goodman, Gowans, Strawson, and others, who suggest there can be no 
free will in Buddhism because there is no self in Buddhism. Third, I con-
tributed a chapter (Agentless) arguing for a particular theory of free will 
that I think is available to Buddhists, based primarily on three things: (1) 
the Buddha's own rejection of a variety of inevitabilist doctrines (inevi-
table causation by fate, gods, matter, chance, karma, etc.), (2) the sort of 
mind-mastery attainable through Buddhist meditative practices, by 
comparison with which the allegedly "strong" (perhaps the strongest) 
Western philosophical conception of free will, namely, the libertarian's 
"leeway" autonomy, the so-called ability to do otherwise under identical 
conditions, and "source" autonomy, the ability to have it that one's 
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choices and actions are up to oneself, appear facile, and (3) the fact that 
an analysis of the meditation virtuoso's mental autonomy enables the 
Buddhist free will theorist to challenge, if not defeat, all of the most 
powerful Western analytic philosophical arguments against free will: the 
Consequence Argument, the Manipulation Argument, the Randomness 
Argument, the Luck Argument, and the Impossibility Argument. 
It bears repeating, and also expounding on, that analysis of the 
meditation virtuoso's skills reveals that the Buddhist conception of men-
tal autonomy is significantly stronger and more robust than even the 
strongest Western philosophical conception of free will, advocated by 
various proponents of leeway and source autonomy. Wallace, McRae, 
and Meyers make similar points about the titanic and supernormal, if 
not supernatural, abilities of the meditation master or enlightened be-
ing, although they do not use this analysis to argue for the theory of free 
will that I propose. Although I do argue for that theory in my latter 
chapter in the edited collection, as I have elsewhere (Possibility; Freedom), 
and in the monograph (Buddhism) I develop these arguments in much 
greater detail, concluding that Western conceptions of strong free will 
are relatively minor features of a much broader and more powerful form 
of mental freedom, freedom of the mind, or mental autonomy, including not 
only freedom of the will and freedom of action, along lines adumbrated orig-
inally by Harry Frankfurt, but also freedom of emotion (which McRae 
makes clear in the edited collection), freedom of attention (which Feder-
man and Ergas make clear in the present collection), freedom of thought 
(which the Buddha himself made clear), and freedom of perception (which 
Gold arguably makes clear in the present collection), among other forms 
of freedom connected with any and all actually or potentially voluntary 
behavior, with the latter qualifier referring to the sorts of supernormal 
abilities of yogis to control otherwise uncontrolled autonomic nervous 
system phenomena. 
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Arguably, Buddhist mental freedom may also be thought to in-
clude freedom from the self, and/or freedom of the self. For, in decon-
structing the self, deconditioning the ego-volitional complex that typi-
cally feeds the self, and revising our understanding of the dynamic me-
chanics of the self-appropriating process, we are able to free ourselves 
from the unwholesome, mindless (ignorant) volitional complex (exem-
plified by the extremes of attraction and aversion, respectively, as greed 
and hatred) identified as the primary source of our pathology. To keep in 
line with the phraseology of being able to have the mental state, voli-
tions, emotions, etc., that one wants as constituting forms of freedom 
ranging over those phenomena, freedom of the self is the ability to have 
the sort of self that one wants to have, namely, a dharmic or enlightened 
one, understood pragmatically as functionally responsive to dharmic 
reasons and conditions and understood metaphysically in insubstantial 
terms, as opposed to a deluded, illusory sense of self as an immaterial 
executive homunculus driving the mind-body and demanding that its 
impulses be satisfied. 6 
Having sketched the topic and the edited collection that serve as 
the focus of this special issue, let me briefly describe each of the contri-
butions to this symposium. They are presented in a loosely-related se-
quence, insofar as in some cases certain themes may be seen to justify 
placing one after the other. Again, I will respond to only two of them in 
my concluding contributions here. 
6 I develop the idea of these freedoms of the mind (of volition, of emotion, of attention, 
of perception, of the self, etc.) in "Freedom of the Mind: Buddhist Soft Compatibilism," 
presently a draft. 
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Katie Javanaud 
Katie Javanaud's contribution, "Tracing the Trajectory of Buddhist Free 
Will Theorizing," raises the level of the discussion presented in Buddhist 
Perspectives on Free Will by categorizing the papers and positions accord-
ing to a useful set of distinctions. Thus, Javanaud distinguishes between 
those who are sceptical of the project of presenting a Buddhist theory of 
free will at all, and those who are not. She further distinguishes among 
the latter, those who think Buddhism admits of an affirmative theory of 
free will and those who think Buddhism admits of a negative theory. She 
also calls attention to the need for deeper analysis, for example, on the 
issue of the extent to which the Buddhist conception of dependent origi-
nation is homologous with or orthogonal to the Western (deterministic) 
view of causation. 
As we will see,Jonathan Gold,James Luisi, and Karin Meyers each 
contribute different analyses of the Buddhist conception of causation 
and/or dependent origination, implicitly answering Javanaud's call for 
such clarification, albeit not in a way that forms any consensus. I argued 
in my later contribution to the anthology (Agentless) that the specifics of 
causation do not actually matter for purposes of the theory of free will 
that I proposed, but I also address the issue here (Me) in my reply to 
Meyers. 
Michael Brent 
In his "Confessions of a Deluded Westerner," Michael Brent arguably 
pushes against Buddhism from the other side. Coming at this from a 
more critical, Western analytic perspective, Brent critiques almost the 
entire collection of papers in the anthology on the grounds that they fail 
to identify what Western philosophers consider necessary and sufficient 
conditions that are definitive or constitutive of the concept of free will. 
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He argues that the various conceptions, abilities, or elements of agency 
identified in the anthology not only do not constitute necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for autonomy, but at most, they only constitute com-
ponents or aspects of intentional action in general, not all of which are 
free. He presents what he (implicitly) takes to be definitive of free will, 
namely, what we may call (i) "leeway autonomy," the ability to have 
done otherwise than what one did, and (ii) "source autonomy," the abil-
ity to have one's actions originate from oneself in such a way that they 
are entirely up to oneself. Distinctive of these, on his analysis, is effort, on 
which elsewhere (Agent) he bases his own agent-causal conception of in-
tentional action, a conception he argues is independent of the question 
of free will. Insofar as effort figures centrally in Brent's model of inten-
tional action, it shares an emphasis with Jonathan Gold's analysis, as we 
shall see below. 
Brent's core idea (in Confessions) seems to be that the agent is the 
cause of free action, just as the agent is the cause of intentional action, 
but those free intentional actions are only those that exhibit leeway 
and/ or source autonomy. He argues, more importantly, that because 
Buddhism rejects the reality of the self, i.e., the agent, there can be no 
intentional action whatsoever, and thus no species of it, such that any 
intentional actions are free. 
This is not a novel view, and as noted above, a handful of the con-
tributors to the edited collection argued there can be no free will if there 
is no self. Brent is aware of this, so his critique may be considered to tar-
get those other views, like mine, Harvey's, and Wallace's, etc., that con-
stitute the majority of views in the anthology, which allow that there 
can be free will even if there is no metaphysically substantive self, but 
only a conventional, empirical one. I will respond to some of Brent's crit-
icisms in my separate reply (Us) to his contribution to this collection, so I 
will defer any further remarks for now. 
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Asaf Federman and Oren Ergas 
Although Asaf Federman and Oren Ergas did not contribute to the anth-
ology, they may be counted among the majority of compatibilist views 
reflected there. In ''The Healing Paradox of Controlled Behavior: A Per-
spective from Mindfulness-Based Interventions," Federman and Ergas 
raise the level of the discussion as they analyze in detail some of the pro-
gressive stages undergone by practitioners of Buddhism-based, but secu-
lar, mindfulness-based meditation practices and related therapeutic in-
terventions. They present an analysis of the process that involves what 
they describe as a paradox of control, my analysis of which suggests that 
their model counts as a counterexample to Brent's claim that there can-
not be agentless agency. 
They note, at an early stage in the meditative process, concentra-
tion is developed through practice, and involves a direct form of mental 
control over attention. However, at a later stage of practice, one devel-
ops a kind of non-control or "choiceless awareness" that nevertheless 
indirectly enables an increase in the ability to control how one responds 
to the contents of consciousness. Their insightful contribution resembles 
the sort of Buddhist-meditation-based analysis of free will that I pre-
sented in this journal in 2010 (Theory), and which I presented again, but 
in much greater detail, in my just-published monograph (Buddhism). 
Their detailed analysis of how mindfulness-based interventions 
help individuals overcome psychopathologies and gain heightened de-
grees of self-regulative abilities not only fits well with my suggestions 
for a Buddhist theory of free will, but displays the extent to which secu-
lar mindfulness practices satisfy the dharmic imperative of reducing suf-
fering and engendering growth in insight. These benefits of their analy-
sis, on my reading, also count as counterexamples to the ever-increasing 
ī
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blowback against secular mindfulness, first popularized by David Loy and 
Ron Purser in their coining of the term "McMindfulness."7 
Jonathan Gold 
Jonathan Gold's contribution, "Freedom through Cumulative Moral Cul-
tivation: Heroic Willpower (V rya)," also raises the level of the discussion, 
insofar as he offers a very close analysis of the chain of dependent origi-
nation, beginning with the ordinary person's hearing the teachings of 
the Dharma and culminating with the attainment of total mental freedom 
or enlightenment. In that analysis, Gold emphasizes the crucial role of 
effort, which implicitly suggests some sort of free will. (Recall that Brent, 
an advocate of libertarian criteria for free will, places effort at the core 
of his analysis of intentional action.) 
However, although Gold delineates the causal sequence of de-
pendent origination (that guides the practitioner to total freedom) with-
in an intuitively explanatory narrative analysis, the explanatory se-
quence of the transformative progressions detailed in his account gives 
the implicit impression that the sequence is otherwise (mostly) determin-
istic, although he does not explicitly emphasize determinism. 
By paying such close attention to the movement between the 
links in the chain of dependent origination, Gold's paper furthers the 
interests of Javanaud's suggestion regarding a clarification of the nature 
of Buddhist causation, on the one hand, but does not exactly answer the 
question explicitly, on the other hand, insofar as his analysis focuses on 
the sort of causation that figures in the path, but it does not focus on the 
7 For a collection of such criticisms, see Purser, Forbes, and Burke, eds., whose collec-
tion includes my own counter-critique in defense of secular mindfulness (Matters). 
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nature of causation in general. And insofar as Gold emphasizes the role 
of effort, he also furthers the discussion put forth by Brent. It is an inter-
esting question how the two views may be combined, if at all. 
Again, like Brent, Gold presses the issue of effort as centrally rele-
vant to the question of free will, insofar as he is implicitly associating 
effort with agency, but, like Federman and Ergas, he does so in a nu-
anced, almost paradoxical way. Gold details the dependently originating 
progression from the worldling's hearing of the Dharma to the final 
phase of the contemplative virtuoso attaining enlightenment, in a way 
that I think is consistent with my own analysis, but one that I imagine 
hard determinists (incompatibilists who accept determinism and thus 
reject free will) could conceivably adopt to support their rejection of free 
will. Arguably, Gold's analysis does not seem to rely on anything that the 
free will advocate seems to require. In all, Gold raises the level of the dis-
cussion, and his analysis raises many interesting questions. 
James Luisi 
James Luisi's contribution, "Buddhist Philosophy, Free Will, and Artificial 
Intelligence," delivers a novel perspective from his work on artificial in-
telligence (AI), quantum computing (QC), and related scientific fields to 
bear on the possible positions on free will open to Buddhist philosophy. 
Luisi argues that the sort of causality involved in AI and QC is neither 
strictly rigidly deterministic, nor strictly chaotically indeterministic, but 
a (middle way) combination of both that circumvents the traditional 
Western philosophical binary dichotomy of either (i) determinism (thus 
no alternatives, and thus no free will), versus (ii) indeterminism (thus 
randomness, thus nothing is up to me, and thus no free will), rendering 
the alleged dichotomy either false or superfluous. In this regard, his 
analysis furthers the discussion of the nature of causation called for by 
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Javanaud, although more directly or immediately on the Western scien-
tific side, but with implications that Luisi applies to the Buddhist side. 
Thus, Luisi argues that his analysis supports what I originally described 
as wiggly determinism, but what I have subsequently revised to describe as 
wiggly causation,8 a conception consistent with Buddhism and which 
makes room for free will. 
However, as I am only minimally familiar with AI, QC, and the 
like, I cannot speak with confidence to the elements ofLuisi's arguments 
that rest directly on those ideas. But I can say that if his account of such 
matters is accurate, then his arguments ought to prove interesting to 
anyone taken in by the Western philosophical binary of determinism 
versus indeterminism. An additionally interesting component of Luisi's 
contribution is his inclusion of a few brief, ironic exchanges between 
speaking neurons, introducing a refreshing element of humor that he has 
employed fruitfully in his books on AI (Sensitive) and enterprise architec-
ture (Pragmatic). 
8 In a paper (Repetti Earlier) critiquing the views of some earlier contemporary period 
Buddhist scholars, such as Francis Story, David Kalupahana, Rahula Walpola, and Luis 
Gomez, I described their attempts to get around the determinism/indeterminism bina-
ry and dichotomy as wiggly determinism because, I argued, they had to accept one or the 
other, for one iota of indeterminism renders a world indeterministic, in which case 
there either is or is not an element of indeterminism in a world. If there is, it is an inde-
terministic world; if not, it is a deterministic world. Those writers claimed Buddhist 
causation is neither rigidly deterministic, not chaotically random, but they seemed to 
favor determinism over indeterminism, based on dependent origination; hence, my 
somewhat critical description, wiggly determinism, which, I argued, was probably 
equivalent to soft determinism, the view that determinism is true but not inevitabilist. 
After discussing the issue with Luisi (Personal), however, I realized it makes sense to 
think a world can be partly deterministic and partly indeterministic; hence, my new, 
not-critical description, wiggly causation. 
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Karin Meyers 
Karin Meyers's contribution, "False Friends: Dependent Origination and 
the Perils of Analogy in Cross-Cultural Philosophy," may be described as 
offering two major components, one positive and one negative, the latter 
breaks into three subcomponents. Her positive contribution is an astute 
analysis of the history of the concept of dependent origination through-
out the development of (mostly Early) Buddhism over the centuries, and 
a fairly thorough answer to Javanaud's call for further clarification 
thereof, similar to Gold's analysis regarding what is narrowly relevant to 
the path. Meyers's analysis of dependent origination may be seen as the 
basis for part of her negative contribution, which latter may be divided 
in three parts: (i) a critique of the idea that dependent origination may 
be identified-or even reasonably compared-with the Western concep-
tion of deterministic causation; (ii) a critique of various of my own ideas 
in Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will; and (iii) a critique of some of the other 
ideas in that collection. The first two critiques seem to take up the bulk 
of her analysis. 
To put Meyers's contributions in a positive light, I take it that 
what motivates her three critiques, and her positive analysis of depend-
ent origination that her critique in (i) above rests upon, is a noble desire 
to protect the textual core of canonical Buddhism in its original meaning 
to non-Western Buddhists, against some of the less textually-based, 
more liberal, Western philosophical interpretations and/ or applications 
of Buddhist ideas as they may be found reflected in the work of some of 
the contributors to the edited collection, including, if not particularly, 
my own work. Philosophical criticism may be understood as a form of 
flattery, insofar as it at least dignifies the ideas being critiqued as worthy 
of engagement, assessment, and (theoretically) open to revision. To her 
credit, Meyers attempts to dignify my ideas in these ways, and she also 
points out many ways in which we arrive at similar conclusions, in which 
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my own contributions to the collection have raised the level of the dis-
cussion, as well as ways in which the collection as a whole constitutes a 
valuable contribution to the literature, among other compliments. I at-
tempt to dignify her ideas equally when I respond to her many critical 
claims in my concluding contribution here (Me). I will postpone any fur-
ther remarks about her contribution until then. 
Marie Friquegnon 
Marie Friquegnon expands on the presentation she gave in her original 
contribution to Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will (Repetti), which intro-
duced three ways of understanding the concept of freedom in Buddhism, 
and applies that understanding to some of the other contributions in 
that collection. In "A Role for Primordial Wisdom in the Buddhist Free 
Will Controversy," Friquegnon goes on to analyze ntideva's teaching 
about the bodhisattva who, employing (the doctrine of) skillful means,9 
kills a pirate to prevent the pirate from murdering 500 men on a ship, 
who themselves happened to be advanced along the bodhisattva path, in 
order to spare the pirate from the terrible karma he would otherwise 
incur.10 
9 This doctrine may be understood as resembling act utilitarianism, the ethical view that 
the morally best action is whichever action, under the unique circumstances, brings 
about the greatest overall positive consequences for the greater number of sentient 
beings affected by the action, among the set of possible alternative actions, all things 
considered. In the case of skillful means, this doctrine may be seen as a wild card that 
only spiritually advanced Buddhists may use to break the otherwise standard ethical 
rules that ordinarily govern the behavior of Buddhists, if and only if the advanced Bud-
dhist is bypassing the rule specifically to the benefit of others who would predictably 
suffer if the advanced Buddhist did not deploy skillful means to such better ends. 
10 According to Buddhist lore, harming anyone or anything connected with the Dharma, 
such as a Buddha, arhat (enlightened being), or bodhisattva, magnifies one's negative 
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To explain and resolve problems with these sorts of cases, 
Friquegnon introduces the idea that primordial wisdom may be under-
stood as a hypothetical construct, a notion she explains in a way that ren-
ders it, to my thinking, similar to the idea of a theoretical posit, and she 
makes an analogy between the Buddhist idea of the divine (implicitly 
reflected in the facially-problematic goodness of the murdering bodhi-
sattva) with what she takes to be Aquinas's use of similar reasoning, 
about how a being beyond human comprehension, namely, God, could 
have human-like qualities, such as benevolence. Friquegnon claims, 
similarly, that the advanced meditator experiences something analogous 
(to the inherent goodness of primordial wisdom) in nondual states of 
meditation: although the experience is nondual, somewhat paradoxical-
ly, the practitioner senses inherent goodness. Ultimately, she treats the 
freedom that consists of enlightenment, which she sees reflected in pri-
mordial wisdom, as central to the highest Buddhist understanding of 
freedom. 
Conclusion 
Together, these papers significantly advance the discussion reflected in 
Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will, and each raises the level of the discus-
sion, some in similar ways, others in different ways. Again, this JBE sym-
posium may be seen to function as a second volume to the original col-
karma exponentially. Thus, the amount of bad karma this pirate would accrue by mur-
dering 500 bodhisattvas is immense. In this example, killing the pirate in order to spare 
him this terrible misfortune is considered merciful. It also resembles utilitarian (conse-
quentialist) arguments in favor of murdering young Adolph Hitler, torturing terrorists 
bent on mass destruction, and the like. For a sustained, interesting argument along 
such lines to the conclusion that Buddhist ethics is a form of negative consequential-
ism, see Goodman (Consequences). 
ī
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lection of seventeen papers. I leave it up to the reader to assess the rela-
tive merits of each contribution here. I also reiterate my suggestion to 
participate in the discussion by supplying short comments to the blog 
using the Comment feature, or longer responses as articles to be submit-
ted to the Journal of Buddhist Ethics. 
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